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For the most part, the past week was a success in the way Israel confronted Iran and its aggression in the region.
Last Sunday, Israel and its allies succeeded in intercepting 99% of the more than 350 drones and missiles Iran had launched at the Jewish state.
Additionally, and in response to the attack, Western governments strongly condemned Iran and vowed fresh sanctions.
And then, on Friday, Israel reportedly struck back. According to media reports, Israel destroyed a key component of Iran’s advanced S-300 air defense system – meant to protect its nuclear facilities – in a sophisticated precision airstrike.
While Israel is officially staying quiet, the assessment is that Iran got the message – it launched more than 350 projectiles, which almost all were intercepted, and Israel reportedly launched just a few missiles that hit their targets.
A success or not?
A success, right? Not exactly. While the blows that were exchanged in this round did not cause much damage – at least not for Israel – the last week marks a stark departure from previous Iranian policy, and it is one that Israel will need to keep in mind going forward.
Consider this hypothetical: had Israel eliminated an IRGC general in Damascus months before the October 7 Hamas attacks, would Iran have considered a direct strike from its soil?
Probably not, since traditionally, Iran avoided direct confrontations, preferring proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, or Islamic Jihad do the work for it.
This has long been the Iranian modus operandi, and it was built out of a strategy that believes it is always better to use proxies since proxies allow Iran to project power far from its borders; proxies provide Iran with plausible deniability, and when proxies are behind attacks there is no reason for the retaliation to be against Iran itself.
This has been the case throughout the years of the shadow war between Israel and Iran.
Israel would reportedly attack a facility in Iran or kill an Iranian or Hezbollah operative and would not have to worry about direct retaliation from Iran. If anything, the response would come from a proxy.
This changed after the Hamas attacks in October and the six months that have transpired since, which saw Israel meet significant achievements in Gaza but not yet reach its objective of toppling Hamas.
Coupled with political instability in Israel, this situation gave Iran the feeling that Israel was weak and that, due to this weakness, it could launch a direct attack without retribution.
A broader concern raised by Israel’s counterattack
This shift is why Israel’s retaliatory strike was crucial, yet it underscores a broader concern.
The latest round might have ended in a success for Israel, but the overall picture is not good.
Iran has breached a previous threshold by attacking directly, meaning that Israel will now have to assume that this can happen the next time it contemplates targeting an IRGC general or an Iranian nuclear scientist.
This does not mean that Israel needs to fear Iran, but it does need to be aware of this development.
This is a new dimension of any potential conflict that needs to be taken into consideration – the conflict with Iran is no longer in the shadows.
Yaakov Katz is a former editor of the Jerusalem Post, a senior fellow at JPPI and author of “Israel vs. Iran – The Shadow War”.
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