Earth-shattering events do not reveal their secrets quickly, and the recent breakdown of Bashar al-Assad’s brutal regime in Syria is no exception. And if understanding why events unfolded the way they did in Syria is challenging, then foreseeing where the country will go from here is even more difficult.
As things stand, there are four central questions that pro-democracy observers of Syria need to ask themselves. The answers will shape the country’s dynamics for the foreseeable future.
The first question pertains to the transformation of the leading Syrian rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), from transnational jihadi militancy to a more Syria-centered version of moderate Islamism. HTS’s leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, has issued reassuring messages since his forces triumphed. Is HTS’s transformation from its al-Qaeda-related origins real, or is it a public relations campaign launched by an actor who needs time to consolidate power before revealing his unchanged radicalism? Assuming there is more to this transformation than theatrics, how far will it go? In truth, a militant group can morph into a political force. Sinn Féin was associated with the militant Provisional Irish Republican Army before becoming involved in the peace process leading to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. In Israel, Menachem Begin’s Irgun turned from paramilitary militancy to political activism via the Herut party––the forerunner of today’s Likud. Given Turkey’s influence over HTS and the Syrian people’s longing for stability after untold suffering, HTS could move away from its extremist roots.
That said, the situation is especially complex in Syria because the rules of the game will have to be invented from scratch. There are few norms, procedures, or basic foundational ideas that all Syrians accept as legitimate––rules that Islamists know they will pay a political price for breaking. Thousands of transnational jihadis who joined the Syrian conflict, including some in HTS, may resist deradicalization. Assuming they refuse, will al-Julani have the authority, let alone the will, to crack down on the more radical factions? It’s difficult to answer this question at this point because HTS is a relative newcomer to the Jihadi game in the Middle East, and reliable information about it remains scarce. While numerous studies and books have been published on groups like Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, or the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, HTS is still enigmatic.
The second question is tied to the first. While HTS is the largest Arab Sunni militant organization in Syria, it is not the only one. Others include the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army and the Southern Operation Room. These organizations fought with HTS against Assad, but they could become rivals for power and leadership.
If rivalries escalate, the familiar story of fratricide civil-wars-within-a-civil-war will repeat itself. Indeed, organizations overthrowing a regime or occupation often collaborate until they achieve their common goal, only to turn mercilessly against each other. Consider the intra-mujahideen civil war following the collapse of Afghanistan’s communist regime in 1992 and the Kurdish civil war in 1990s Iraqi Kurdistan. Within Syria, HTS forcefully subdued rival groups like Ahrar al-Sham in 2017 and Hurras al-Din in 2019. Should Sunni factions turn on each other, the “Somaliazation” of Syria—descent into complete chaos and warlordism against a backdrop of a failed state—could ensue.
But this grim scenario is not inevitable. HTS has demonstrated political acumen so far, and it may be able to assuage rival groups via cooptation or complete absorption. Moreover, the international community is interested in avoiding new migratory flows that will indeed resume if Syria implodes. This exogenous factor can play a role in stabilizing the situation and avoiding doomsday scenarios.
The third question pertains to inter-sectarian relations in Syria. The Assad dynasty hails from the Alawis, an offshoot sect of Shia Islam whose followers are traditionally despised as heretics by the ruling Sunnis in the Middle East and so never thrived under Sunni rule, whether it be Ottoman or Syrian. The Assad regime instrumentalized the Alawis’s resentment of Sunnis to transform the community into a tool of government repression. The Alawi blood feuds that have roiled Syria since 1970, when Hafez al-Assad seized power, until 2024, when his son Bashar lost it, are numerous and frightening. It is difficult to imagine Sunni-Alawi relations healing in the immediate future, given the depth of Sunni suffering under Assad and Alawi complicity in his crimes. It is vital for the future of Syria that Sunni suffering be acknowledged and that at least some of Assad’s most notorious henchmen be brought to justice. Ideally, this could include Bashar al-Assad himself in the unlikely event that Putin allows it. But Sunni revanchism should not be allowed to turn into collective punishment of Alawis. Furthermore, Syria’s Christians and Druze should be recognized as citizens on par with fellow Syrians rather than merely being tolerated as dhimmis, i.e., protected minorities under Islam.
The Kurdish question in Syria is more urgent, if only because the Kurds yield powerful militias and have been self-ruling for years. Given the history of Arab repression, Kurds are understandably reluctant to accept Damascus’ rule. A federal arrangement could manage complex Arab-Kurdish relations, but Arab political culture considers federalism a partition in all but name. The Arab Sunni majority in the region was always suspicious of minority clamor for self-rule. And groups that did ask for it were frequently accused of trying to create a “second Israel.” The Lebanese Christians stand as a case in point in this regard. Turkey loathes an autonomous Kurdish region to emerge in Syria, and since it’s likely to become the new dominant outside actor in Syria now that Iran and its cronies—not only Assad but Hezbollah and Hamas—have suffered a crushing defeat in the region.
This leads to the fourth and final important question: Can Syria again avoid becoming a playground for foreign powers? In the 1950s, Syria nearly imploded under the stress of the global Cold War, pitting the U.S. and the former Soviet Union against one another, and the Arab Cold War, involving Arab supporters of the Americans and the Soviets in a merciless struggle for regional supremacy. Until Hafez al-Asad stabilized Syria under his rule with an iron fist and a tilt toward Moscow, foreign interventions, whether they be international or regional, wreaked havoc in the country. Today, both Americans and Russians have military posts in Syria. Arabs look askance at Turkey’s gains. And Iranian allies, though battered, are positioned not too far away in Lebanon and Iraq. Can Syria be protected from the seemingly never-ending game of nations in the Middle East?
