Iran’s attacks on Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and other Gulf states have erased any remaining distinction between Israel’s confrontation with Tehran and the security threats facing the wider region.
For years, Gulf governments relied on American protection, maintained discreet security ties with Israel and kept diplomatic channels open with Iran. Understandably, these countries avoided public cooperation with Israel out of concern that open alignment would provoke Tehran, inflame domestic opinion and complicate relations with other Arab states.
That approach may have offered room for maneuver during quieter periods. It is no longer sufficient when Iranian missiles and drones are targeting Gulf territory, threatening American bases and placing ports, airports, energy facilities and desalination plants at risk.
Iran has demonstrated that countries do not need to be at war with it to become targets. Hosting US forces, assisting regional defense efforts or obstructing Tehran’s ambitions can be enough. Israel and the Gulf states face different political circumstances, but the weapons threatening their populations come from the same arsenal and serve the same strategy.
The response must therefore become regional.
Regional defense is essential after Iranian attacks
Israel and the Gulf states already possess many of the capabilities required for a shared defense system. Israel has extensive experience detecting and intercepting ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones. Gulf countries have invested heavily in Patriot, THAAD and other defensive platforms. The United States operates radar, air-defense systems and command infrastructure across the region.
Existing cooperation has helped during periods of crisis, but much of it remains discreet, fragmented and dependent on urgent decisions made after attacks have already begun. That may be workable when threats are limited. It is dangerous when several countries are facing simultaneous launches and critical infrastructure can be struck within minutes. The current conflict has shown how quickly isolated national systems can be overwhelmed, bypassed or forced to react alone.
A formal framework should begin with real-time intelligence sharing and a common early-warning picture. Radar data must move quickly between Israel, Gulf states and US forces, with agreed procedures for identifying incoming threats and assigning the system best positioned to intercept them.
Joint exercises should test more than missile interception. Governments must prepare for airport closures, cyberattacks, hospital surges, disruptions to electricity and water supplies, and strikes on oil facilities, ports and desalination plants. Civil-defense agencies should train together just as military commands do.
This framework would not require every participating country to normalize relations with Israel immediately. Cooperation can expand in stages, with the United States acting as convener and guarantor. Some elements may initially remain discreet, especially while the Palestinian issue continues to shape Arab public opinion.
Discretion, however, cannot continue to mean improvisation. Missile-defense coordination must function through permanent channels, not emergency phone calls. Intelligence sharing must follow agreed procedures, not political calculations made during each attack. Regional security cannot depend on whether leaders are prepared to acknowledge cooperation publicly.
Some governments may fear that a formal defense structure would provoke Iran. Tehran’s attacks have already weakened that argument. Gulf states that sought to avoid escalation have still been targeted. Defensive integration would not be a declaration of war. It would reduce Iran’s ability to exploit gaps between national systems and would make its attacks less likely to succeed.
Israel should pursue this opportunity carefully. Public boasting about covert ties would embarrass Gulf governments and make cooperation harder. Israeli leaders should also avoid presenting regional coordination as proof that the Palestinian issue can be ignored. Quiet, professional engagement will achieve more than political triumphalism.
The Gulf states should likewise recognize that Israel’s defense technology, intelligence capabilities and operational experience can help protect their cities and infrastructure now. Israel benefits when Iranian launches are detected earlier, when regional partners share information and when the burden of defense is distributed across several countries.
Iran has already created a shared battlefield. Israel, the Gulf states and the United States must now build the permanent regional defense system needed to protect it.
Source:
www.jpost.com
