It is difficult to see an agreement with Tehran that would be good for Israel as long as the current regime remains in power.
One may debate the tactical questions, whether uranium will be removed, who will supervise the process, and what enforcement mechanisms will be applied, but from Israel’s perspective, the real question is far broader.
The issue is not only what Iran does on the day an agreement is signed, but what remains in its hands the day after: enrichment capabilities, missile systems, scientific knowledge, and regional influence.
Any agreement is also expected to bring sanctions relief, the unfreezing of assets, and renewed economic oxygen for the regime.
From Jerusalem’s perspective, the danger lies not only in leaving Iran with threshold capabilities but in giving the regime breathing room that would allow it to recover, consolidate itself, and continue building regional power under the cover of an agreement.
Iran’s strategy is to preserve its power beyond the current crisis
The Iranians are not thinking only about the current crisis, but about the one that follows it. For Tehran, time is not merely a framework; it is part of the strategy.
While the West measures success by halting immediate escalation or signing an agreement, Iran thinks in longer cycles. From Tehran’s standpoint, even a restrictive agreement can serve as a pause in a game that continues far beyond the term of any particular American president.
This is, in effect, a struggle between different clocks. The American clock moves according to election cycles, markets, and immediate results. The Israeli clock moves according to the sense of threat and the distance from the bomb.
The Iranian clock moves more slowly, with the patience of a regime prepared to absorb pressure as long as its infrastructure remains intact. Tehran understands that Trump is, in many respects, an exception in the American landscape: a president willing to apply maximum pressure and sustain an economic and regional confrontation over time.
For the Iranians, the question is not only how to get through the current crisis, but how to reach the day after Trump, when Washington may again prefer diplomacy, agreements, and risk management over prolonged confrontation.
That is precisely the perspective troubling Israel. Jerusalem is not examining only the text of a possible agreement, but the time horizon it creates.
For Israel, debates over supervision, enrichment, and enforcement mechanisms are important, but they are not the heart of the story. The deeper question is whether the agreement actually dismantles Iran’s threshold capability, or merely manages it for a limited period.
The Israeli fear stems from the understanding that the regime in Tehran does not view the nuclear program as a temporary bargaining chip, but as long-term strategic insurance. Jerusalem is therefore less concerned with what Iran may do tomorrow morning than with the possibility that it emerges from the crisis while preserving infrastructure, knowledge, and capability, waiting for a more convenient political window in Washington.
This is also how the saga surrounding the Strait of Hormuz should be understood. Here, too, the gap between Jerusalem and Washington is clear.
While the United States views Hormuz primarily as a threat to trade, energy, and global stability, Israel views the same arena as part of a much broader deterrence system. Today, that system is centered mainly on Lebanon and Hezbollah, especially after the weakening of Iran’s position in Syria.
For Israel, Hormuz is only part of the picture. Lebanon remains a far more central component in the Iranian equation.
Hezbollah is not merely a military asset or an arm of regional influence. It is Iran’s strategic security belt against Israel.
Through Hezbollah, Tehran retains the ability to directly threaten the Israeli home front without using its own force directly. That is why it is difficult to see Iran truly giving up Hezbollah, even as part of a broader arrangement.
Such a concession would not be interpreted in Tehran as a diplomatic gesture, but as consent to move away from Israel’s border and lose its central lever of influence in the eastern Mediterranean. For the Revolutionary Guards, the presence in Lebanon is not only a matter of supporting an allied organization, but part of Iran’s entire deterrence architecture.
Recent developments in Lebanon have only reinforced this sense in Jerusalem. Even after months of confrontation, attrition, and Israeli strikes, Hezbollah continues to look for ways to preserve a threat equation against Israel, including through drones, pinpoint fire, and attempts to erode Israel’s sense of superiority.
From Israel’s perspective, this is a reminder that even if a nuclear agreement is signed, the Iranian threat will not disappear. It will simply change form.
Here lies perhaps the deepest gap between Israel and some of its allies in the West. While some in Washington and Europe view an agreement as an objective in itself, many in Jerusalem see it, at most, as a mechanism for delay.
Israel’s difficulty is not only in believing Iran’s intentions. It is in believing that a regime that has spent years building a system of proxies, deterrence, and regional threats will truly agree to give up the central assets that guarantee its power.
Therefore, from Israel’s perspective, the question is not only whether an agreement will be signed, but what kind of Middle East will remain afterward: one in which capabilities are genuinely dismantled, or, more likely, a pause that allows Iran to preserve its strategic assets until the next window of opportunity.
Source:
www.jpost.com
