By Isaac Hammouch
The new migratory crisis in Ceuta has abruptly revived memories of 2021 and placed relations between Morocco and the European Union back under strain. Yet behind the issue of migration lies something much deeper: trust between two partners that have become interdependent. Trade, security, migration, Western Sahara, investment, and diplomatic leverage are all intertwined. Is Europe now viewing Morocco differently? And will this crisis leave a lasting mark?
Ceuta, or the Abrupt Return of an Issue Thought to Be Resolved
Only a few months separate two almost contradictory images of the relationship between Morocco and the European Union. On January 29, 2026, in Brussels, the fifteenth EU–Morocco Association Council celebrated a decades-old relationship. Europeans and Moroccans spoke then of a “privileged strategic partnership,” of mutual trust, and of a shared desire to relaunch and deepen their cooperation. Migration, security, trade, ecological transition, innovation, development, and regional stability were among the many areas in which Rabat and Brussels intended to move forward together.
Then Ceuta returned to the headlines. In late July, an exceptionally large wave of arrivals hit the Spanish enclave located on Morocco’s northern coast. Madrid cited approximately 72,000 entries within a few days, whereas Moroccan estimates were significantly lower. The majority of individuals subsequently returned to Morocco, but several thousand remained in Ceuta, and the crisis resulted in a heavy human toll. Beyond the numbers, an immediate question emerged in Spain and within European institutions: how could such a wave occur at one of the most heavily monitored borders between Africa and the European Union? And behind this initial question lies a second, politically far more explosive one: could Morocco have prevented this crisis? This is where the 2021 precedent becomes essential.
2021: The Crisis Europe Has Not Forgotten
In May 2021, around 9,000 people entered Ceuta by land or sea in a very short period. Among them were numerous minors. The event occurred at the worst possible moment for relations between Madrid and Rabat. Spain had agreed to hospitalize Brahim Ghali, leader of the Polisario Front, officially on humanitarian grounds. Rabat viewed the way this hospitalization was arranged as a severe breach of trust between the two countries. Weeks later, the Ceuta crisis erupted.
The European interpretation was particularly severe. In a resolution adopted on June 10, 2021, the European Parliament explicitly rejected Morocco’s use of border control and migration—specifically unaccompanied minors—as a tool of political pressure against an EU member state. The wording was exceptionally strong. Yet another element of that text is worth recalling today: despite its condemnation, the European Parliament simultaneously called for preserving the strategic relationship between the European Union and Morocco and returning to a constructive, reliable partnership. The entire paradox of the current relationship was already contained in that resolution. Europe could severely criticize Morocco’s conduct while still concluding that it needed the country. Five years later, that contradiction remains.
The 2026 Crisis Is Not Identical to 2021
A simplistic conclusion must be avoided here. The 2021 precedent does not automatically prove that the 2026 crisis was organized by Rabat. Morocco rejects this accusation. Moroccan authorities notably point to a Spanish judicial ruling from July 8 that limited the ability to immediately return certain individuals who had entered the Spanish enclaves irregularly. According to Rabat, this legal shift weakened the deterrent effect of border enforcement and was quickly exploited by smuggling networks and information circulating on social media. Moroccan officials also maintain that controls were not deliberately relaxed, pointing to the substantial human resources deployed for years to prevent irregular departures to Europe.
On the Spanish side, questions remain. The President of Ceuta, Juan Jesús Vivas, accused Rabat of favoring or permitting the influx. Reports citing Spanish intelligence services suggest a more complex picture: a loosening of border controls may have facilitated crossings without establishing that an operation was directly orchestrated by Moroccan authorities. This distinction is fundamental. A rigorous analysis must therefore separate two things: the documented political precedent of 2021, and the disputed attribution of responsibility for the 2026 crisis. Politically, however, Morocco faces a broader problem: the memory of 2021 inevitably shapes how every new crisis is interpreted in Madrid and Brussels.
What Europe Truly Reproaches Morocco For
The issue therefore extends far beyond the number of migrants who crossed the border. Europe’s real concern is the predictability of its Moroccan partner. For years, the European Union has progressively externalized parts of its border control by building partnerships with transit and origin countries. Morocco occupies an exceptional position in this system. It controls a vital section of the migration routes across the Western Mediterranean and the Atlantic. It cooperates with Spain against smuggling networks. It serves as an essential partner in counter-terrorism and cross-border crime enforcement.
However, this model only functions if cooperation survives diplomatic friction. Ceuta raises precisely this question: what happens when the political interests of Rabat and those of a European state sharply diverge? Does migration remain a protected area of cooperation shielded from diplomatic disputes, or can it become an instrument of leverage? It is this concern—far more than the migratory numbers alone—that explains the European reaction.
Brussels Begins Speaking the Language of Leverage
The reaction of the European Commissioner for Home Affairs and Migration, Magnus Brunner, is telling in this regard. Following the Ceuta crisis, he argued that the Union must be capable of making greater use of its available instruments—mentioning visas and trade specifically—to secure solid cooperation from Morocco. This idea is politically significant. It implies that some European officials no longer want the security of an external EU border to depend excessively on the goodwill of a third country.
European policy could therefore shift from a framework of pure cooperation to one based more heavily on reciprocity: migration management in exchange for European benefits. Europe undeniably holds considerable leverage. Yet Morocco holds significant leverage as well. This is precisely why a complete breakdown would be costly for both sides.
The Paradox: Six Months Earlier, Brussels Was Celebrating Trust with Rabat
The timeline is striking. On January 29, 2026, during the EU–Morocco Association Council in Brussels, EU High Representative Kaja Kallas and Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita celebrated a partnership built, according to their joint statement, on more than half a century of cooperation and mutual trust. Both parties reaffirmed their commitment to deepening what they described as a privileged strategic partnership.
Six months later, a European Commissioner cites visas and trade as potential leverage to guarantee Moroccan cooperation on migration. The contrast is dramatic. Yet viewing this as the start of a final rupture would likely be an error. It reveals, instead, the changing nature of the Morocco–Europe relationship.
Can Europe Truly Do Without Morocco?
Hardly. Trade figures alone illustrate why. In 2025, total trade in goods between the European Union and Morocco reached approximately €62.2 billion. The Union remains the Kingdom’s leading trade partner and its primary foreign investor. Morocco, for its part, is the EU’s top trading partner among Southern Neighborhood countries.
Compounding this economic interdependence are security, counter-terrorism, migration management, energy, the automotive industry, European supply chains, agriculture, infrastructure, and joint ambitions in renewable energy. Morocco also possesses another trait that has become increasingly valuable to Europeans: stability. In a region stretching from the Sahel to Libya and the Middle East, the European Union views the Kingdom as a partner with which it can build long-term policies. A severe deterioration in relations with Rabat would carry a substantial cost for Brussels. But the reverse is equally true.
Can Morocco Do Without Europe?
Not easily either. Geography remains uncompromising. Europe represents Morocco’s largest export market, a major source of investment, and a critical partner for industry, tourism, infrastructure, and technology transfer.
This mutual dependency is precisely the strongest safeguard against an outright rupture. Rabat and Brussels may clash sharply over specific issues. They may enter periods of deep mistrust. Yet their interests routinely bring them back to the negotiating table. That is what occurred after 2021, and it is likely what will happen after 2026.
Western Sahara Remains the Other Great Equation
Any analysis of EU–Morocco relations would be incomplete without addressing Western Sahara. This issue intersects with almost every major diplomatic friction Morocco experiences with certain European partners. For several years, Rabat has made clarifying international positions on Western Sahara a cornerstone of its diplomacy. A number of European states have shifted their stances, some significantly. In 2022, Spain recognized the Moroccan autonomy initiative as the most serious, realistic, and credible basis for resolving the dispute. France went even further in its rapprochement with Rabat.
A distinction must be made, however, between national European governments and EU institutions. In October 2024, the Court of Justice of the European Union highlighted the specific legal constraints surrounding the application of EU–Morocco agreements to Western Sahara. This gap between the diplomacy of European capitals and EU law creates an exceptionally complex dynamic. Rabat can achieve political breakthroughs with Paris, Madrid, or other governments while continuing to face hurdles before European judicial bodies. From the Moroccan perspective, this periodically feeds the perception that Europe is sending contradictory signals.
Has the European Perception of Morocco Changed?
Yes, likely. But not in the simplistic sense of a Europe that has grown hostile toward Morocco. The shift is deeper. Morocco is no longer viewed merely as a Southern Neighborhood nation receiving European funding, cooperation, and preferential market access. It is now seen as a regional actor with its own defined interests, ambitions, and, above all, significant negotiating power.
In other words, Morocco has grown stronger within its relationship with Europe. That evolution mechanically triggers a European reaction. As Morocco becomes increasingly indispensable, Europeans become acutely aware of the risks of overdependence. This is particularly visible in migration. When the system functions smoothly, Rabat appears as a partner protecting the European border. When the system breaks down, that same reliance is viewed as a vulnerability. This is the central paradox of the relationship.
Europe Now Views Rabat as a Partner… and as a Power
For decades, Euro-Mediterranean relations were defined by a steep asymmetry. Europe held the capital, the market, the investments, and the political clout. Southern nations sought access to those assets. That architecture is shifting. Today, Morocco holds multiple key assets: its geographical position, its stability, its African diplomatic footprint, its infrastructure, its security cooperation, its renewable energy potential, its role in migration control, and its integration into European industrial supply chains.
Rabat consequently negotiates much more as an equal. Yet transitioning from an asymmetrical relationship to a power-based dynamic—even between partners of different scale—inevitably generates friction. What Moroccan officials view as the legitimate defense of national interests may be perceived in Brussels as political pressure. Conversely, what Brussels views as the neutral application of EU law can be interpreted in Rabat as an infringement on its strategic interests. The relationship has thus become more mature, but also more contentious.
Is Trust Truly Broken?
Likely not. It has, however, become far more conditional. That distinction is important. A complete breakdown of trust would imply that Brussels now views Morocco as an unreliable partner with which relations should be wound down. That is not the case.
Only days after the crisis, Rabat signaled its readiness to cooperate with Spain and other European countries to identify and facilitate the return of unaccompanied Moroccan minors. That gesture is politically significant. It shows that Morocco itself has no interest in allowing the image of a country using migration as a permanent diplomatic tool to take root—a perception that could ultimately prove costly.
Were Brussels to conclude that migratory surges systematically serve as leverage during disputes with Rabat, the consequences would reach far beyond Ceuta. Europeans would likely seek to reduce their vulnerability, strengthen their borders directly, and attach stricter conditions to benefits granted to partner nations. Such a scenario would serve neither Europe nor Morocco.
Will All of This Be Forgotten?
In diplomacy, crises are rarely forgotten; rather, they are absorbed. The 2021 episode demonstrated this. Months after one of the most serious diplomatic rifts between Rabat and Madrid, both capitals gradually rebuilt their relationship. Spain adjusted its position on Western Sahara, migration cooperation resumed, and economic exchanges expanded. Yet when Ceuta came under pressure in 2026, the memory of 2021 resurfaced instantly.
Crises may fade from the headlines without disappearing from institutional memory. The present crisis will likely follow a similar path. It will be managed; migrants will gradually be processed or returned; Madrid and Rabat will continue negotiations; Brussels will pursue refined mechanisms for cooperation; and economic trade will resume its customary role. Yet within European administrations, a lingering question will remain on file: what happens during the next major political disagreement with Rabat?
Neither a Breakup nor a Return to the Past
The most probable scenario is neither a rupture between Morocco and the European Union nor a simple return to the status quo ante. Something shifted after 2021, and the 2026 crisis may accelerate that change.
The European Union will likely attempt to make its cooperation with Morocco more institutional, more predictable, and more explicitly tied to mechanisms of reciprocity. Rabat, for its part, will continue to demand a relationship anchored in respect for its strategic interests and greater recognition of its regional weight. Both partners will continue to need each other, but they will drive harder bargains.
The Real Question: Who Depends on Whom?
That may ultimately be the wrong question. Europe depends on Morocco for key aspects of its southern security, migration policy, and economic and energy ambitions in the Mediterranean. Morocco depends on Europe for a vital share of its trade, investment, and industrial development. Their reliance is mutual, even if not fully symmetrical.
It is precisely this interdependence that renders an outright break improbable. The Morocco–Europe relationship is entering a new phase. It is no longer a traditional dynamic between a major European economic power and a Southern Neighborhood state; it is evolving into a continuous negotiation between two partners who fully understand the value of the cards they hold. Ceuta simply exposes the friction points of that reality.
After Ceuta, Trust Will Not Vanish—But It Will No Longer Be Naïve
The crisis will eventually recede from the front pages. Economic interests will reassert their weight, ministers will meet, agreements will be negotiated, and security and migration cooperation will continue. To assume that nothing has changed, however, would be a mistake.
Europe will continue to view Morocco as a vital strategic partner—perhaps even more critical than before. Simultaneously, it will seek to mitigate the vulnerabilities arising from that reliance. Morocco will continue to demand that Europe treat it not merely as a beneficiary of neighborhood policy, but as a regional power with which it must negotiate.
That is the emerging reality. Trust between Morocco and Europe is not disappearing; it is becoming monitored, negotiated, and conditional. Paradoxically, this may be the hallmark of a relationship reaching maturity. Between states, trust never implies the absence of power dynamics—it reflects the capacity to maintain a working partnership despite them.
Ceuta stands today as the test of that capacity.
