The failure of the June 26 protest movement cannot be explained by fear of Hamas alone. Fear certainly existed, but it was not the decisive factor. Gaza has witnessed repeated protests against Hamas over the years.
Between 2017 and the period before October 7, residents confronted Hamas security forces on several occasions. Even during the war, spontaneous demonstrations broke out demanding food, water, electricity, and simply the right to live. This suggests that fear alone does not explain why the June 26 movement failed to gain momentum.
In my view, the first major factor was the absence of genuine political support for the demands of Gaza’s residents. Many people in Gaza feel they have become peripheral to the priorities of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah.
Their suffering has increasingly been treated as a political file rather than the daily reality of more than two million people searching for dignity and normal lives. As a result, protesters found no credible political institution willing to embrace their demands or transform them into a national political project.
Offering a serious vision for Gaza
A second factor was the emergence of groups and personalities presenting themselves as alternatives to Hamas without convincing the public that they offered a serious vision for Gaza’s future. Much of their activity appeared focused on media visibility rather than demonstrating effective governance, public services, or a practical plan that could earn the confidence of ordinary citizens. For many Gazans, media attention is not a substitute for leadership.
At the same time, I do not believe Israel was the primary reason the movement failed. From a political perspective, Israel had an interest in highlighting public dissatisfaction with Hamas rather than suppressing it. Ultimately, however, the success or failure of any protest movement depends far more on its internal organization, leadership, and credibility than on external actors.
Even these factors, however, do not fully explain what happened. The deeper problem was the absence of a clear political vision for what would come after the protests. There was no unified leadership inside Gaza, no agreed political program, no organizational structure capable of sustaining momentum, protecting demonstrators, or transforming public frustration into a coherent political movement.
Some activists believed social media could create a political leadership. In reality, it created a media moment, not a political one. After years of war and destruction, Gazans are not looking for viral videos or symbolic gestures. They are looking for leaders who live among them, share their hardships, and are willing to accept responsibility for difficult decisions.
The current Palestinian political reality
In Gaza, we have a popular saying: “Our cause has become like a sack of onions – wherever you reach inside, you pull out another head.” The expression perfectly captures today’s Palestinian political reality.
Everyone wants to be a leader. Everyone wants the microphone, the camera, and the public spotlight. Yet very few are willing to shoulder the burden of leadership. Too many heads do not create leadership; they often reveal its absence. When everyone wants to lead, no one is left willing to take responsibility.
History offers many examples of protest movements that struggled for similar reasons. Some of the uprisings associated with the Arab Spring succeeded in mobilizing massive public support and even weakened or removed existing governments.
Yet in several cases, they failed to produce unified leadership or a credible political alternative, allowing fragmentation, renewed conflict, or more organized political forces to fill the vacuum.
Gaza is a unique case with its own realities, but the lesson remains relevant: Public anger alone is not enough. Successful political change requires leadership, organization, and a realistic program capable of earning public trust.
Criticizing the June 26 movement does not mean rejecting peaceful civic protest. On the contrary, Gaza’s residents continue to seek dignity, security, and civilian governance that places the interests of ordinary people above those of competing political factions.
However, any future movement will likely face the same outcome if it repeats the same mistakes: fragmented leadership, internal divisions, and an overreliance on media exposure instead of organization and political strategy.
This article reflects my personal assessment of the events and is intended as an analysis of why the movement struggled, not as a definitive account of everything that occurred.
The writer is a Gazan political activist living in Belgium and the co-founder of the We Want to Live movement.
Source:
www.jpost.com
